In my paper I deal with the jurisprudential interpretation of ius puniendi by providing a historical overview of theories concerning this notion in a time span of almost 6000 years until it became a state monopoly and the humanization of criminal law. The interpretation of ius puniendi as the legal ground of punishment is based on different principles in different ages. The jurisprudential interpretation becomes less relevant with the birth of the legal state, when ius puniendi is a state monopoly. Nowadays the meaning of ius puniendi has been modified and broadened with new, different elements, since the principle of opportunity plays a more decisive role in the criminal law systems of modern states. In my study I interpret and examine ius puniendi unlike the classical authors of criminal law, i.e. a notion referring to the legal ground of punishment, but in its original meaning, i.e. the right of punishment, because of its modern function. With my work my aim is to answer the question whether the dogmatically elaborated category of ius puniendi has to be incorporated into the substantive and procedural jurisprudence of the 21st century.